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Julian Ku

The Prospects for the Peaceful Co-Existence of
Constitutional and International Law
There is much to admire in Michael Stokes Paulsen’s elegant and bold
polemic on the Constitution and international law. Paulsen deserves
substantial praise both for offering a clear and accessible theory of the
Constitution and international law, and for then bravely taking that theory to
its logical though controversial conclusions. He rightly emphasizes that the
Constitution is supreme over international law and that the political branches,
Congress, and the President, have an independent and dominant role in the
interpretation of international law’s effect on the United States. He also
properly criticizes those who have used their interpretations of international
law to support highly politicized attacks on the Bush Administration’s war on
terrorism policies.
Although I warmly welcome Paulsen’s articulate and persuasive voice to
(my favored side of) the ongoing debate over international law and the U.S.
Constitution, we are not in complete agreement. It is not surprising that
Paulsen, as a leading scholar of constitutional law, concerns himself only with
the classic questions of constitutional law and is largely unconcerned with the
impact of his analysis on the international legal system. Even so, I find it hard
to understand this almost gleeful dismissal of international law, which is worth
quoting at length:
The force of international law is thus largely an illusion. Once
the fog has lifted, international law as it concerns the United
States—treaties of the United States, executive agreements,
customary international law norms and practices—can be seen as
largely a matter of international politics and policy, not binding
“law,” at least not in the sense in which law is usually
understood. It is international relations or international politics
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dressed up as law. It may be highly relevant in that sense—that
is, as a rhetorical, political trope—but it is essentially irrelevant as
law. To misquote Clausewitz once again, international law is
simply the continuation of international politics by other means.1
In this Response, I will explain how one can accept Paulsen’s constitutional
arguments while continuing to believe that international law is more than an
illusion for the United States. I will begin by situating Paulsen’s argument
within the broader intellectual debate over the relationship between
international law and the U.S. Constitution. I will then argue that although his
constitutional arguments are sound, they do not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that international law has no legal force. To the contrary, I will
argue that where the political branches clearly (and pursuant to their
constitutional powers and following the proper constitutional processes)
decide to bind the United States to follow rules of international law as law, the
United States is bound as deeply as it is bound to any other nonconstitutional
legal norm.
I will then conclude by considering perhaps the most powerful example of
how international law can be transformed into a binding legal rule in the U.S.
system that is arguably more powerful than other forms of U.S.
nonconstitutional law: international delegations of legal authority to
international organizations. Like Paulsen, I am troubled by the implications of
such delegations for constitutional law. But rather than simply reject such
delegations as unconstitutional, I offer a more flexible approach to
accommodate the political branch’s desire to delegate this authority while
maintaining constitutional legitimacy and accountability.
i. where paulsen is right
As Paulsen acknowledges, his Essay does not offer a radically new point of
view. Almost all scholars acknowledge Paulsen’s fundamental premise of
constitutional supremacy over international law.2 For this reason, the vast

1.
2.
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Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power To Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J.
1762, 1804 (2009).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
302(2) & cmt. b (1987); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 187 (2d ed., Clarendon Press 1996) (1972); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty
Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 393 (1998). Cf. Peter J. Spiro, Treaties,
International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1999 (2003) (acknowledging
the dominance of the constitutional supremacy view but offering a theory for rethinking this
approach in the context of individual rights). But see FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN, THE
CONSTITUTION AS TREATY: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONALIST APPROACH TO
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majority of commentators that have addressed similar questions have, like
Paulsen, analyzed these issues on purely constitutional grounds.
In this way, Paulsen’s argument slides comfortably into the longstanding
and straightforward separation of powers debate over which branch of the
federal government should have the power to adopt binding interpretations of
international law. Most of the “internationalists” that Paulsen criticizes could
also be called “judicialists” because they typically support a robust role for
domestic courts in the interpretation of international law.3 By the same token,
Paulsen’s “constitutionalist” views could easily be adopted by those scholars,
like myself, who support an independent and dominant role for the political
branches of the federal government in the interpretation of international law.4
Thus, I agree with Paulsen that a rule of international law should generally
have no legal force in the U.S. legal system unless that rule of international law
has been independently adopted by one or both of the political branches of the
U.S. government.5 This means that a treaty has no legal force in the U.S.
system unless the President and Senate have indicated their intent to make a
treaty self-executing or unless Congress implements the treaty’s provision by
statute.6 Similarly, I also agree with Paulsen that a rule of customary
international law has no domestic legal force unless Congress adopts the rule
by statute pursuant to one of its delegated constitutional powers. The President
can also declare adherence to or interpret a rule of customary international law
on matters within his constitutional purview. In some cases, federal and state
courts may also interpret a rule of customary international law as long as they
have done so consistent with their jurisdiction under the Constitution and as
long as their interpretations do not conflict with interpretations adopted by
Congress or by the President on matters within his exclusive constitutional
authority.7

3.
4.

5.

6.
7.

THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (2007) (arguing that the U.S. Constitution has the status of a
treaty among the states, and must therefore be interpreted consistent with international
law).
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).
See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to
the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153; John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy
and International Human Rights Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739 (2009).
John Yoo and I have argued that, in some circumstances, states may adopt rules of
customary international law subject to preemption by the federal government’s political
branches. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 4, at 199-219.
See Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last in Time Rule for Treaties and Federal
Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 327 (2005).
See Ku & Yoo, supra note 4, at 199-219.
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As John Yoo and I have argued elsewhere,8 there are sound reasons to favor
an approach that gives the political branches of the U.S. government the
preeminent authority to interpret and control the impact of international law,
whether treaties or customary international law, within the U.S. legal system.
Not only is political branch dominance in this area the most natural
interpretation of the Constitution’s text and structure,9 but these branches also
possess substantial functional advantages over federal courts in the
interpretation of international law.10 These functional advantages further
strengthen the case for political branch control over the interpretation or
incorporation of international law.
ii. where paulsen is wrong
Supporting a dominant role for political branches in the interpretation of
international law does not imply support for international law as merely a
species of policymaking. Indeed, the political branches are the primary reason
that international law is more than just an illusion. For better or for worse, the
political branches of the U.S. government depend and rely on international law
as “law” to pursue various important policies on behalf of the United States.
Such policies encompass a very broad range of topics, including the
harmonization of private contracts for sale of goods;11 the enforcement of
private and public arbitration awards;12 the terms of international trade in
goods and services;13 the extradition of criminal suspects;14 the adoption of
children;15 the protection of diplomats and consular officials;16 the use and

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

14.
15.
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See Ku & Yoo, supra note 4, at 181-99; see also Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the
New World Court Order, 81 WASH. L. REV. 1, 65-69 (2006).
See Michael D. Ramsey, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2007).
See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the
Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 181-99.
See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
concluded Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S.
159; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, concluded Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3; North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, U.S.-Braz., Jan. 13, 1961-June 18, 1962, 15 U.S.T. 2093;
T.I.A.S. 5691; 532 U.N.T.S. 198 (Dec. 17, 1964).
See, e.g., Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption, concluded May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167.
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limitation of chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons;17 the protection of
human rights;18 and climate change and environmental protection.19 The list
of topics is nearly endless.
Not only does the U.S. government wield international law as a tool of
policy, but private parties often rely on international law as law to shape and
organize their activities. Private parties contracting for the sale of goods or
enforcing their arbitral judgments are not likely to be amused when told that
they are acting pursuant to merely illusory norms.
In other words, the political branches, the President and Congress, often
need and want international law to be more like law than politics. For this
reason, the President and Congress often take actions to legalize U.S. legal
obligations under international law. The President can, for instance, declare
U.S. adherence to particular norms of international law and he can direct lower
executive branch officials to adhere to such norms.20 Congress can enact
statutes incorporating international law norms into U.S. law.
To be sure, the President can revoke or alter his interpretations of
international law, and Congress can repeal prior statutes or treaties. This is a
necessary power that, as Paulsen rightly points out, flows from the premise of
constitutional supremacy over international law. But the fact that the President
or Congress can, pursuant to particular constitutional processes, repeal or alter
international law obligations does not mean those obligations are not “law.”
Any kind of federal regulation or legislation is just as vulnerable to repeal or
alteration pursuant to the same constitutional processes. But that does not
mean we should declare those legal norms illusory. To put it another way, if
international law is illusory within the U.S. system, so is every other kind of
law that is not constitutional law.

16.
17.

18.
19.
20.

See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done Apr. 18, 1961, 22 U.S.T. 3227,
T.I.A.S. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, done Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800;
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. See generally Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on Their Destruction, done Mar. 26, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368.
See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
adopted Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148.
Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea
Bed of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 39 (1945 Supp.); Policy of
the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas,
Proclamation No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 40 (1945 Supp.).
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iii. the problem of delegation
Far from devaluing international law, the political branches sometimes seek
to raise international law “above” or at least “outside” of the typical constraints
imposed on domestic nonconstitutional law. The problem here is not that
international law is not enough like law, but that the political branches favor
“legalizing” international law too much. These institutions may be authorized
to issue “legal” rulings to which the U.S. government is bound (as a matter of
domestic law) to follow.
The Supreme Court recently considered an example of such a delegation in
Medellín v. Texas.21 This case involved a petition by Medellín, a Mexican
national facing execution by the State of Texas, and the effect of an
interpretation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR”) by
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). According to Medellín, the U.S.
Supreme Court was obliged to follow the ICJ’s interpretation of the VCCR
because of two separate treaty provisions. Medellín’s theory of the case was
that the political branches, the President and the Senate acting together, had
delegated the power to interpret U.S. obligations under a treaty (the VCCR) to
the ICJ. Once that delegation was made, the Court and other judicial entities
were required to treat the ICJ’s interpretations as binding and authoritative. In
Medellín itself, the Supreme Court avoided the delegation issue by interpreting
the relevant treaties to be “non-self-executing.”22 That is to say, the Court
refused to find that the intent of the political branches was in fact to make such
a delegation. Indeed, the Court appeared to require a clear statement of intent
before it would recognize such a delegation.23 But as the Court itself
acknowledged, there are treaties where the intent of the political branches to
make similar delegations is crystal clear, or at least clearer than in the Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the UN Charter.
Most prominently, the Court cited24 Article 54 of the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States (ICSID),25 which requires the United States to recognize an ICSID
award “as binding and [to] enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that
award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that
State.” Congress put to rest any doubt whether Article 54 is a sufficiently clear

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
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128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
Id. at 1356 n.2 (2008).
Julian G. Ku, Medellín’s Clear Statement Rule: A Solution for International Delegations, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 609 (2008).
128 S. Ct. 1373 (2008).
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
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statement of intent by enacting a statute obligating U.S. courts to give ICSID
awards “the same full faith and credit as if the award” was a judgment of a state
of the United States.26
ICSID demonstrates not only how international law can attain the status of
law, but also how, with the assent of the political branches, it can acquire a
status different from, and potentially more independent than, other forms of
domestic law. ICSID requires, essentially, that U.S. courts enforce the
judgment of an international arbitral tribunal without any independent judicial
review of the merits of that judgment or that tribunal’s interpretation of the
ICSID treaty or any other related treaty. Not surprisingly, Paulsen’s
constitutionalist analysis renders short work of such delegations, which violate
“the Constitution’s exclusive assignment of U.S. governmental powers to
Article I, Article II, and Article III constitutional actors.”27
Although straightforward, Paulsen’s analysis is hardly satisfying given the
practical need for deeper levels of U.S. cooperation with international
institutions and the sheer lack of textual or historical precedent on this
question. In prior work,28 I have argued that courts should subject such
delegations to a “super-strong” clear statement rule to ensure that the
delegation was intended. But where the statement was “super-clear,”29 as it is
in the case of ICSID, I am inclined to find such delegations constitutional as
long as such delegations also satisfy the nondelegation doctrine.
I depart from Paulsen not because I value international law and
mechanisms for international cooperation more than he does. Rather, it is
because I believe that the political branches should enjoy substantial deference
in their judgments about how to use international law to pursue U.S. policies.
Although there are many circumstances where international law should not act
as a serious constraint on U.S. government activities, I believe it can act as a
constraint where the political branches want it to be a constraint and follow the
proper constitutional processes to make it such a constraint. This understanding, I
believe, is most consonant with the Constitution’s text, structure, and design.

26.
27.
28.
29.

22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a) (2006).
Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1805-06 n.113 (2009).
See Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, supra note 8, at 5966 (2006).
See id. at 51-52.
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conclusion
Paulsen’s eloquent entry into the debate on the Constitution and
international law is a valuable reminder that the Constitution is the supreme
touchstone of the status of international law, not international law itself or the
needs of the international system. Yet obeisance to the Constitution does not
render international law a meaningless illusion. Rather, the Constitution
allocates to Congress and the President the power to transform international
law into binding domestic law that is as binding as any other kind of U.S. law.
For better and for worse, then, international law will continue its co-existence
with constitutional law as an important form of law for the United States.
Julian Ku is the Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development at
Hofstra University School of Law.
Preferred citation: Julian Ku, The Prospects for the Peaceful Co-Existence of
Constitutional and International Law, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 15 (2009),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/2009/09/29/ku.html.
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